Globalisation and Cosmopolitanism: Continuity and Disjuncture, Contemporary and Historical.
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Abstract
Globalisation and cosmopolitanism are treated differently in various literatures. The relations of each to the political state and migration, in terms of mobilities and enclavement, are also variably treated in different sources. The paper shows that these concerns are not confined to early twenty-first century developments but drew attention in accounts of globalisation in seventeenth- and eighteenth century social economies.

Introduction: Globalisation and Cosmopolitanism
The relationship between globalisation and cosmopolitanism has drawn the attention of a number of writers who have presented different sets of possibilities on the basis of different definitions or accounts of each. Globalisation is typically defined in terms of ‘time-space compression’ (Harvey 1990) or ‘time-space distanciation’ (Giddens 1990) resulting from a modernity in which there is an ‘intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities’ (Giddens 1990: 64). This formulation of globalisation replicates Durkheim’s late nineteenth-century definition of social density, not only through its reference to the role of developments in communications and transportation (Durkheim 1964: 259-60), but in the idea that an increase in social density enhances the possibility of relationships between geographically separated units as ‘the real distance between individuals has itself diminished in some way’ (Durkheim 1964: 256-7; see also 339 footnote). Indeed, Durkheim regards the economic ramifications of these processes as breaking down ‘the frontiers which separate peoples’ and involving production for ‘consumers spread over … the entire world’, as well as changes in the structure of civil society and alterations in the character and scope of the social sciences (Durkheim 1964: 369-71; 1992: 72). It is no accident that on this basis Durkheim offers an early version of cosmopolitan sociology (Turner 2006: 140-41). Indeed, the spatial definition of globalisation corresponds with the idea of globalisation in terms of flows and mobilities (Hannerz 1997; Urry 2000), a notion compatible with a conception of cosmopolitanism in terms of trans-national travel and converging consumption patterns in cuisine, media and fashion (Appadurai 1996), the plural loyalties of individuals (Hollinger 1995: 86; Cohen 1992: 482), an attitude of mind characterised by openness to others and cultural translation (Delanty 2006; Hannerz 1996; Vertovec and Cohen 2002), and so on. In these terms globalisation and cosmopolitanism may be taken as distinct aspects of a continuous or at least connected set of processes.

A different approach to globalisation emphasises not spatial contraction but power relations, including those in which de-territorialised economic powers compete for world market shares (Strange 1996). A conception of globalisation in terms of power effectively delinks it from a necessary association with globe-shrinking late modern information technology and points instead in the direction of expansive networks of trans-territorial relations of super-ordination and sub-ordination. In this vein Anthony Hopkins (2002: 21-36) identifies four historical periods of
globalisation: the ‘archaic’, involving pre-state Asian, African and European empires and their trading diasporas in tributary and luxury commerce; ‘proto’ globalisation, from approximately 1600 to 1800, in which European colonisation and associated slave and plantation economies encroached on the Americas and parts of Asia and Africa; ‘modern’ globalisation, from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, based on West European and American industrialisation, involving economic interdependence and organisational inter-nationalisation; and finally ‘post-colonial’ globalisation, in which supra-national entities such as the World Bank play an increasingly important role and in which significant cultural processes sponsored by the internet, global media and popular culture are significant. Associated with each form of historical globalisation are correspondingly different forms of cosmopolitanism associated with different social groups.

An aspect of globalisation readily grasped when it is understood in terms of power relations is the apparently contradictory fragmentation that is associated by some authors with contemporary globalisation but which is difficult to conceptualise when globalisation is treated as a primarily spatial phenomenon characterised by flows and mobilities. An aspect of globalisation in this sense is captured in the concept of ‘enclave society’ (Turner 2007), which is not an alternative to the concept of globalisation but to the characterisation of it exclusively in terms of mobility, transnationality and cultural and political cosmopolitanism. Turner (2007: 290) argues that in addition to forms of mobility globalisation also involves ‘closure, entrapment and containment’ (see also Fulcher 2000: 534-5). In enclave society:

governments and other agencies seek to regulate spaces and, where necessary, to immobilise flows of people, goods and services. These sequestrations, exclusions and closures ... seek to exercise governmentality... over populations by enclosure, bureaucratic barriers, legal exclusions and registrations ... for both domestic and international regulation (Turner 2007: 290).

The opportunities provided by increased mobility through globalisation for the movement of criminal activity, for instance, disease, illegal migration and political terrorism across borders gives rise to the need for states to increasingly engage techniques of containment (Turner 2007: 290), thus arises ‘the paradox that globalisation also produces new systems of closure’ (Turner 2007: 289). Turner (2007: 300) regards these developments as responsible for a situation in which cultural differences become ‘institutionalised and produce fragmented, isolated, and underprivileged social groups’ with a realistic prospect for members of such groups of ‘a life in prisons, detention camps, inter-state zones, departure lounges and a variety of other intermediate, quasi-legal arenas’.

It might be assumed that a fragmented globalisation in which state power is directed towards enclavement tends to undermine cosmopolitan prospects. Certainly this approach is compatible with the idea that economic globalisation enhances rather than depletes the opportunities and capacities of states (Hobson and Ramesh 2002; Weiss 1999; see also Giddens 1990: 70). It therefore challenges or at least qualifies the idea that global forms of supranational governance and the trans-national enhancement of democracy and human rights generate a latent cosmopolitanism in the form of global citizenship (Boli and Thomas 1997; Delanty 2000; Falk 1994; Held 1995).

These different accounts of globalisation raise questions concerning possible relationships between cosmopolitanism and the state. In contrast with an historically earlier view of cosmopolitanism as a project of political governance, associated with Enlightenment thinkers, is the more recent idea that cosmopolitanism can be
understood in terms of a ‘principal of world openness associated with global publics’ (Delanty 2006: 27). This shift from a political or ethical to a sociological conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism is strenuously defended in a number of publications by Ulrich Beck, in which it is argued that there are many cosmopolitanisms and that it is possible to distinguish between cosmopolitanization as a social process – what he calls ‘globalisation within societies’ – and cosmopolitanism as a methodological device (Beck 2002; see also Beck 2006). Beck (2000) provocatively argues that a rights-based form of cosmopolitanism is manifest in the humanitarian interventions of states such as occurred in the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia, and by extension possibly in the 2011 military strikes by NATO in Libya.

The state enforced cosmopolitanism Beck identifies functions to distinguish the first age of modernity ‘based on international law’ and the second ‘based on human rights’ (Beck 2000: 83): ‘In this framework, the Nato bombing in response to the genocide in Kosovo appears as a striking breach of international law ... [but a] government may now forfeit the recognition of its sovereignty under international law by a blatant violation of human rights of its own citizens and on its own territory’ (Beck 2000: 82-83). The ‘paradigm shift’ entailed in this development, in which ‘international law goes over the heads of nations and states and addresses individuals directly’ posits a cosmopolitanism comprising a ‘legally binding world society of individuals’ (Beck 2000: 84). Yet Beck’s acknowledgement that not all states and therefore not all individuals as human rights subjects can be located in this paradigm shift, and that some states may engineer its form for their own purposes made possible by a ‘world monopoly of power and morality’ (Beck 2000: 85) effectively transforms his discussion from analysis to metaphor. Indeed, his claim that globalisation ‘implies the weakening of state sovereignty and state structures’ (Beck 2000: 86) may be true for some states (those subjected to such dominant state practices) but not for all states and is therefore untrue as a general statement (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Mann 1997; Weiss 2003). Indeed, the checklist of empirical indicators of cosmopolitanization which Beck (2000: 96-97) provides is effectively neutral on state sponsorship.

The discussion to follow shall indicate that globalisation both promotes and undermines cosmopolitan tendencies, a conclusion suggested for the present stage of globalisation by the concept of enclavement as outlined by Turner. There is a suggestion in Turner’s argument that these developments are late twentieth-century responses to contemporary economic contingencies which generate electoral pressures on plebiscitary governments. But rather than being of recent origin the themes Turner points to, of opposing trends of an expansive globalisation and at the same time a restrictive state containment of foreigners, may be a more enduring paradoxical relationship of globalisation that does not require the mediation or facilitation of electoral politics. A related matter concerning the cosmopolitan outlook or disposition is its differential incidence in which the same configuration of globalisation provokes both cosmopolitanism and its antipathy among different social groups. Finally, the interactive generation of globalisation and state power cannot be regarded as a recent development, a fact revealed by consideration of a classic account frequently but erroneously assumed to show that global markets render the political state ineffectual. Indeed, these problems of what Beck calls the ‘second age of modernity’ and Hopkins describes as ‘post-colonial globalisation’ are already manifest in the period of Hopkins’ proto-globalisation’. An examination of these issues of globalisation and cosmopolitanism in a seventeenth- and eighteenth-century context not only provides an historical perspective on contemporary themes, but permits examination of classic sources that dispels some misleading current readings.
Seventeenth-century Enclave

The seventeenth century is regarded by historians as a period of crisis, in which political and religious change was associated with demographic and military instability (Aston 1965; Parker and Smith 1997). At the same time it was an age of burgeoning commerce and international trade, in which trade wars between states adhering to monopolistic policies were conducted on behalf of overseas trading companies possessing outward cross-border orientations. These different features of ‘mercantilism’ made it an ambiguous if not paradoxical phenomenon. A shift in the centre of gravity of capitalist development from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic was consolidated during this time and the existence of a world market was established within it (Hobsbawm 1965; Wallerstein 1974). The practice and doctrine of this mercantile period determined that an increase of a nation’s wealth could only be achieved if foreign trade was governed by a singular rule, namely, ‘to sell more to strangers yearly than wee consume of theirs in value’ (Mun 1664: 125; see also Petyt 1680: 371-4). A balance of trade in favour of export required high customs against imports and a prohibition on export of a nation’s wealth in the form of gold and silver. And yet an element of the free trade argument usually attributed to writers of the following century emerged at this time not so much against these restrictive aspects of the political economy, although that did occur, but principally against the monopolies that dominated English commerce of the period and its foreign trade.

Given that the crown granted commercial monopolies it is not surprising that the movement against monopoly had a parliamentary source. At the beginning of the seventeenth century Sir Edwin Sandys’s ‘Report from the Committee [of the House of Commons] on Free Trade, 1604’ found that ‘the mass of the whole trade of all the realm is in the hands of some two hundred persons at the most, the rest serving for a show only, and reaping small benefits’ (Sandys 1604: 437). The restriction of freedom of trade imposed by monopoly, Sandys found, was ‘against the natural right and liberty of the subjects of England’ (1604: 437). His expectation was that when trade is free there would be no fall in the price of commodities, a fear the monopoly lobby encouraged, but rather that ‘many young men will seek out new places, and trade further for great benefit’ (1604: 439). In its expression at the time, as in its later manifestation, the argument for free trade was one for the further expansion of commercial activity, including global expansion.

Characteristically for the seventeenth century, trade could be free only if it were protected. This prospect was made clear in ‘The Commissioners of Trade and Plantations Report on the State of Trade, 1697’ that ‘enquire[d] into the several obstructions of trade and the means of removing the same’ and also into ‘what manner and by what proper methods trade may be most effectively protected’ (Commissioners of Trade 1697: 568). The Report charted the extent of involvement of English traders in foreign markets during the period 1670 to 1697. These markets included: Sweden and the Baltic, Denmark and Norway, France, East India, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, Barbary, Guinea, the American Plantations, Hamburg and Germany, Holland and Flanders, Russia, Newfoundland, Greenland and the fisheries of the Northern seas. Not only was the balance of trade between England and each of these reported, but also what components of imports from particular countries were re-exported. The picture that emerges is one of seventeenth-century England at the centre of a significant global economy.

Free trade doctrine, especially as developed by Adam Smith in the eighteenth century, is frequently held to be a statement of economic cosmopolitanism, as shown
below. Regardless of how this later argument is interpreted, seventeenth-century proponents of freeing trade from monopoly could not be understood as entertaining cosmopolitanism in any direct sense as the national interest was explicitly paramount in their deliberations. The marginal title that opens Lewes Roberts’ The Treasure of Traffike or A Discourse of Forraigne Trade summarises exactly an ethos of the age, namely that ‘No Man is born for himselfe, but for his Countrey’ (Roberts 1641: 57). Indeed, it is the institutional strengthening of the nation and the conflict between nation states that gave rise to the need during the seventeenth century for international law. The contribution of Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, for instance, through elaboration of natural law principles, to this development, is frequently regarded as laying the basis for a philosophically-grounded cosmopolitanism. Grotius’ claim, that ‘among the traits characteristic of man is an impelling desire for societ… not of any sort, but peaceful, and organised, according to the measure of his intelligence’ (quoted in Sabine 1964: 423), is taken to underpin the possibility of a moral community transcending national boundaries. Desiderius Erasmus’s similar idea of over one hundred years earlier, namely that nature ‘necessitates [in humankind] mutual assistance …[and] has amply provided man with inducements to peace and concord’ (Erasmus 1964: 179-80), similarly indicates a cosmopolitan current coterminous with originlal capitalist globalisation. The motif of common humanity as a cosmopolitan theme suggests a test for any cosmopolitan ethos at the time in the treatment of alien nationals in the contemporary English discussion of global commerce.

Although the seventeenth-century English economy is typically characterised in terms of commercial or mercantile capital, its industrial basis is acknowledged and reflected in recognition towards the end of the century of the importance of labour in production, as in William Petty’s statement that:

People are … the chiefest, most fundamental, and pretious commodity, out of which may be derived all sorts of Manufactures, Navigation, Riches, Conquests, and solid Dominion (Petty 1680: 458).

John Locke writing in 1689 similarly claims that ‘labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things’ (Locke 1965: 339). Even before these statements appeared their recognition of the significance of labour to economic well-being was reflected in debates concerning migrant labour earlier in the century. Trans-national migration is a phenomenon that links in various ways economic and political causes and concerns. Economically migration is associated with the movement of both capital and skill, with means of employment and labour supply; politically, it raises concerns of nationality, citizenship and rights more generally, as well as questions concerning security, for both the host society and the alien migrant. A global economy relies upon and encourages migration (Turner 2007: 293-4). This was certainly the case in seventeenth-century England. Removal of the disability of alien status, then, can be taken as an element of a cosmopolitan ethos.

The number of complaints and petitions against foreign crafts-workers and traders during the seventeenth century is a measure of the extent of their settlement in England at the time. In 1622 alone there were complaints and petitions in London against aliens from organisations of goldsmith’s, coopers, clockmakers, brokers, leather-dressers, and others (Thirsk and Cooper 1972: 716-21). Later years saw additional complaints (Thirsk and Cooper 1972: 725-9, 735-7). In 1661 ‘The Council of Trade Deliberations on the Petition Against the Aliens’ accepted the petitioners claim that ‘there are multitudes of foreigners who do employ themselves in the manufactures specified in the petitions about the City of London’ (Council of Trade 1661: 737). But it went on to observe that if the aliens were to be removed and ‘would
plant their manufactures elsewhere’ it would be to ‘the prejudice of the kingdom’
(Council of Trade 1661: 737). Indeed, the point is made that these aliens ‘carry not
the wealth of the land out of the kingdom, but marry and incorporate here and bring
their children up in the same crafts and occupations, who become native English’
(Council of Trade 1661: 738). These assessments, including the pivotal last one
concerning the transmutability of alien status through residence and generation, are
made repeatedly throughout the century.

Economic writers, noting the contrary view of ‘self-interested ignorant
Traders’ (Petyt 1680: 358) argued for the settlement and naturalisation of (only)
Protestant foreigners in order to achieve the economic benefits of expanded demand
and importation of capital and expertise (Roberts 1641: 80; Violet 1653: 724-5;
Fortrey 1673: 219-24; Houghton 1677: 263-5; Petyt 1680: 358-9). Indeed, legislative
support to attract alien workers in particular industries was enacted for the sake of
England’s national economic enhancement, but such aliens has the requirement of
‘taking the oaths of allegiance and supremacy’ (Thirsk and Cooper 1972: 738-9). Yet
the nation was unable to offer naturalisation in return. A Bill of 1673 to naturalise
aliens was unsuccessful (Thirsk and Cooper 1972: 744-5) and an Act naturalising
alien Protestants, passed in 1708, was repealed in 1711 (Thirsk and Cooper 1972:
749-50).

The seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century debate concerning economic
migrants is in many ways a mirror to twenty-first century concerns. A globalising
economy generates a clear demand for migrant labour. In doing so it ostensibly
encourages a cosmopolitan tendency, a sentiment represented in the works of many
economic experts. And yet, the strengthening of national reservation and the
imperatives of state control that appear as responses to globalisation lead in turn to a
resolutely anti-cosmopolitan outcome for the treatment of aliens, not only in terms of
national citizenship.

Laissez-faire, globalisation and cosmopolitanism
Having considered the structure of relations in the case of a globalised seventeenth-
century English economy and society it is appropriate to now turn to the theory of the
global economy and its relationship with both cosmopolitanism and the political state
as it was developed by Adam Smith in the eighteenth century. Smith’s position will
be given clear relief by comparing it with the approach of a nineteenth-century critic
of Smith, Karl Marx.

In a remark directed against the economic or mercantile writers of the previous
century Adam Smith, writing in 1776, observed that the merchants knew ‘in what
manner’ foreign trade ‘enriched themselves’ but not how it ‘enriched the country’
(Smith 1979: 434). Against the thinking of the previous generation Smith notes that
‘the exportation of gold and silver in trade might frequently be advantageous to the
country’ and that the regulation of the requisite quantity of these metals required only
‘the freedom of trade’ and not ‘the attention of government’ (Smith 1979: 433). Even
more pointedly Smith suggests that the earlier concerns were not only false but
misplaced when he says that ‘it is not by the importation of gold and silver, that the
discovery of America has enriched Europe …[for through] the abundance of the
American mines, those metals have become cheaper’ (Smith 1979: 447). But it was
the discovery of America itself, he continues, that ‘by opening a new and
inexhaustible market to all the commodities of Europe’ was impetus to the
development of productive capacities in particular and new wealth in general (Smith
1979: 448). Even more significant was the ‘discovery of a passage to the East Indies,
by the Cape of Good Hope, which … [opened] a still more extensive range to foreign commerce than even that of America’ (Smith 1979: 448).

Smith understood that the expansion of markets produced not only extensions of bi-lateral trading relations but was generative of an economic globalisation in which all countries were involved in more generalised arrangements. He says that in addition to the augmentation of the industry of those countries that trade directly with American colonies there are similar benefits to those countries that trade indirectly ‘through the medium of other countries’ (Smith 1979: 591). In addition there is a less visible consequence that ‘encourage[s] the industry of countries, such as Hungary and Poland, which may never, perhaps, have sent a single commodity of their own produce to America’ insofar as American products – sugar, chocolate, tobacco – are consumed in these countries and ‘must be purchased with something which is either the produce of the industry of Hungary and Poland, or with something that has been purchased with some part of that produce’ (Smith 1979: 591-2). It is the idea, associated with Smith, that free markets are both internationally expansive and that national government is unnecessary to the process – that free markets produce ‘free men’ – that has led to the notion that economic globalisation is in this sense cosmopolitan. Thus a test for the cosmopolitanism of laissez-faire globalisation is the degree to which the national state becomes irrelevant in the economic liberalisation of a global economy.

For Smith globalisation provides a fiscal incentive for individuals to be cosmopolitan: ‘The proprietor of stock is properly a citizen of the world, and is not necessarily attached to any particular country’ (Smith 1979: 848-9). Indeed, the opposition in this sense between globe and nation is made clear when he suggests that such movement might be prompted by ‘a burdensome tax’ (Smith 1979: 849). The potential mobility of capital is not uniform according to Smith, however, as he says that ‘capitals employed in the agriculture and in the retail trade of any society must always reside within that society’ whereas the ‘capital of the wholesale merchant … may wander about from place to place, according as it can buy cheap or sell dear’ (Smith 1979: 364). The apparent opposition indicated here, between globalisation on the one hand and the state on the other, is not a situation that Smith necessarily accepts, however. Indeed, when he repeats that the ‘discovery of America … and the passage to the East Indies … are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind’ (Smith 1979: 626), he prefaces his remarks with an argument for American representation in the British parliament on the basis of taxation (Smith 1979: 624-5). We shall return to this complication in Smith’s economic cosmopolitanism. Before doing so it is instructive to compare his account with that of Karl Marx writing just sixty years after Smith.

In close summary of Smith, Marx famously declared that the ‘discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie … [and] gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known’ (Marx and Engels 1970: 36). The discovery of America ‘paved the way’ for the establishment of the world market, continues Marx, a market that ‘has given an immense development to commerce’ which has in turn allowed the bourgeoisie to ‘conquer for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway’ (Marx and Engels 1970: 37). Marx goes on to say that the ‘need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe … [and that] through its exploitation of the world-market give[s] a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country’ (Marx and Engels 1970: 38-9). Marx astutely observes that it is not only in material but ‘also in intellectual
production’ that national ‘one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible’ (Marx and Engels 1970: 39). It might be noted in passing that the conception of cosmopolitanism indicated here by Marx is not political or ethical but sociological.

And yet a political cosmopolitanism of the global capitalist economy is more a prospect than a reality in Marx’s estimation. Even if national boundaries yield to economic and intellectual penetration, the national political state and its class political functions remain, indeed are enhanced and augmented. Relatedly, because of the oppressive domination of capitalist production for those who are subjected to it through employment, free markets do not produce ‘free men’, as Smith supposed. Marx agrees that the world market is cosmopolitan insofar as ‘working men have no country’ (Marx and Engels 1970: 51). This is because modern industrial labour is labour subjected to capital, and because of the homogenising force generated by the needs of capitalist production, capitalistic labour is ‘stripped … of every trace of national character’ (Marx and Engels 1970: 44). But in order to free itself from capitalist domination ‘the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle’ (Marx and Engels 1970: 45). It is in the development of the working-class struggle against capital that the true cosmopolitanism of an international working class organisation arises, according to Marx (Marx and Engels 1970: 63). At best, then, the development of commerce leads production, as Marx said in Capital, to be ‘cosmopolitan …[and] therefore has a … dissolving influence everywhere on the producing organisation’, but ‘whither this process of dissolution will lead … does not depend on commerce, but on the character of the old mode of production itself” (Marx 1971: 331-2).

The global capitalist economy generates the possibility of a generalised cosmopolitanism, according to Marx, but not its realisation. Marx holds that within a capitalist global economy the state necessarily serves a class function insofar as it supports the economic needs of the capitalist class. In contradiction with this latter prospect the drive for liberation from economic and political domination leads the proletariat to a cosmopolitan course in creation of an international working class movement. Indeed, the late modern identification among some writers of cosmopolitanism with privileged life-styles and associated values and its antithesis with disadvantaged groups is empirically unfounded (Holton 2005: 13-14, 144-45).

Smith and Marx could not be further apart on the question of what is necessary for ‘true’ cosmopolitanism. And yet the issue does not depend on their respective assessments of the relationship between the global economy and the national state, as we shall see. This is because in addition to Smith’s remarks concerning the cosmopolitan consequences of stock ownership he offers an account of cosmopolitan possibilities premised on the character of human nature. For Marx’s proletarian insurrectionism Smith offers what he regards as universal moral sentiments that underlie not only human sociality but also industriousness, including the ‘self-command’ that finds common expression in American Indians, for instance, and thrifty Protestants (Smith 1976: 145-56), even though the sentiment of sympathy has a perilously limited range (Smith 1976: 136-7). The emotional basis of common humanity, in Smith’s account in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, contrasts with the more frequently mentioned contemporary Kantian notion that it is reason that unifies humans into a single moral community.

In other ways, however, Smith and Marx are less distant than they may at first appear. Smith’s argument that the growth of international commerce can only be achieved through the free market and in the absence of state interference is not
absolute. Indeed, he says that it is quite utopian to expect ‘that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored’ (Smith 1979: 471). When Smith makes clear the qualifications necessary to explain the actual operations of expanding international trade, his position and Marx’s are remarkably close and it emerges that for Smith the global economy relies in many ways on national states and in that sense must bear an ambiguous relationship with cosmopolitan tendencies.

Returning to consideration of the advantages to Europe of American and East Indian trade Smith notes that it is necessary to distinguish ‘between the effects of the colony trade and those of the monopoly of that trade’ for one is ‘always and necessarily beneficial’ and the other is ‘always and necessarily hurtful’ (Smith 1979: 607). And yet, in practice, he continues, the colony trade is so beneficial that, ‘notwithstanding the hurtful effects of that monopoly, is still upon the whole beneficial, and greatly beneficial’ (Smith 1979: 607-8). And even though he says here that monopoly is ‘always and necessarily hurtful’ he goes on to say that ‘When a company of merchants undertake, at their own risk and expense, to establish a new trade with some remote and barbarous nation, it may not seem unreasonable … to grant them … a monopoly of trade for a certain number of years’ (Smith 1979: 754). This is a measure that Smith acknowledges is necessarily supported by the military and other instrumentalities of the state (Smith 1979: 755). It would be a mistake to assume that Smith holds that the state’s support of the free market is only ever temporary. While individual merchant companies may have state provision of monopoly for a limited time only, there is no requirement that only one company receive such benefit or that several such benefits be fitted into a single time frame. The state’s involvement, therefore, will be continuous though the advantage of monopoly to any single company may be of limited duration.

In his discussion ‘of the expense of justice’ and the role of the state Smith acknowledges that from the pastoral stage of societal development the growth of property gives rise to a need for the state or ‘civil government’ to secure the advantage of possession against the possibility of rebellion against injustice (Smith 1979: 710). Indeed, so important is this fact in Smith’s estimation that he uses it in his argument against contract theory. This understanding of the necessity of the political state under conditions of private ownership must be joined to another observation made by Smith regarding the behaviour of property owners. Smith reports the inclination of employers to form combinations, often covert, to protect and advance their own interests (Smith 1979: 84). He also acknowledges the power of what he calls the ‘authority of riches’ (Smith 1979: 711). The concatenation of these many factors indicates that those who directly benefit from the international market are ever likely to draw upon the resources of the national political state in advancing their commercial and manufacturing interests. In more general terms, Smith notes the role of the state in the provision of an infrastructure necessary for commerce: ‘the erection and maintenance of the publick works which facilitate the commerce of any country, such as good roads, bridges, navigable canals, harbours, etc’ (Smith 1979: 724).

Smith shows, then, that property owners in order to satisfy their interests harmonise the international or global market and the institutions and operations of the national state from the point of view of their own needs. It is for this reason that his analysis of international market expansion demonstrates that the tendency and dynamic of the global economy depends on and strengthens the national state in its relation with trans-national capital. Cosmopolitan tendencies under such circumstances are subject to cross-cutting imperatives, depending on the
contingencies of both global capital and national state, and their changing interactions.

**Conclusion**
The relationship between globalisation and cosmopolitanism can be considered against the backdrop of over four centuries of exchanges between them. Seventeenth-century discussions of migrant labour and access of aliens to citizenship was discussed above, as well as eighteenth- and nineteenth-century accounts of state support for global capitalism. While the possibility of cosmopolitan tendencies emerges under globalisation counter forces operate through which aspects of globalisation undermine or limit them. It is never the single common thread linking globalisation and cosmopolitanism that effectively indicates the full relationship between the two, but the contradictory relationship between them that relies on a number of different connections both inhibitory as well as enhancing, involving enclavement as well as mobilities. Most important of all is the necessity of the nation state to economic globalisation and the possible antipathy of a political state, defending locally-based trans-national interests in a global world, to cosmopolitan aspirations.

The state’s support of globalisation is not confined to the mercantilist period, in which it was legitimated by prevailing doctrine, but also during the period of laissez-faire, when prevailing doctrine appeared to deny the fact although, as shown here, it is clear in Adam Smith’s classic statement. The forms of globalisation and cosmopolitanism have changed much over four centuries. What remains constant, however, is the paradoxical and uneven relationship between globalisation and cosmopolitanism at the institutional level through the enduring role of the nation state in support of economic globalisation.
References:


